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Latter-day South African Spatial Planning And Problem Solving 
Initiatives Against A Globalisation Backdrop, And The Redrawing Of 
Boundaries 
 
Introduction 
Introduction 
Arguably, South Africa (SA) was most notorious for its system of apartheid and most famous for 
its transition from apartheid and the enigma that is Nelson Mandela.   This has meant that a 
country sitting on the southern tip of Africa, far removed from the hegemonic bustle of Europe 
and America, has enjoyed quite some attention on the world stage.  This was not always the 
case, and SA was once quite economically, and politically dislocated from the world stage, 
ensconced in its “laager“ in the face of economic sanctions, and academic, cultural and sporting 
boycotts.  
   
The notion of the laager runs deep through SA’s veins – the original pioneers, or “Voortrekkers”, 
would draw their oxwagons into a circular formation, or laager, so as to protect themselves and 
their livestock from attack.    During the apartheid era and with SA’s pariah status, successive 
nationalist politicians aimed at self-sufficiency for SA, in order to beat sanctions and fight 
apartheid opponents.  Accordingly, SA established MOSSGAS and SASOL to try and attain 
energy independence, and ARMSCOR, for weapons self reliance, which included a nuclear 
capability (McGowan 1993).  It was hoped that whites and blacks could then get on with their 
“separate” lives, where “separate” of course had a spatial dimension as well – a plethora of 
legislation and polices dictated that these two group should live apart, hence – “apartheid.”   
 
But no country is “hermetically sealed” from the rest of the world, and SA was important to at 
least the US, as a strategic ally in the cold war (McGrew 1992), and also because of its vast 
stocks of strategically important and other minerals.  (In 1982, SA accounted for fully 64,6 
percent of Western world gold production, although this had declined to 33,7 percent by 1992  
(McGowan 1993: 56)). 
 
With the advent of a post-apartheid SA in 1994, the situation has changed dramatically.  Gone 
are the mostly inward looking policies; the country has political legitimacy and is now firmly part 
of the global economy – consider some anecdotal and harder evidence for this: where once 
South African politicians were essentially booed off the world stage, Nelson Mandela’s 2003 
85th birthday celebration was attended by a phalanx of local and overseas luminaries (including 
Queen Beatrix, the Clintons, Oprah, and Robert de Niro).  More “globally telling”, was the fact 
that the glittering event was sponsored by the Coca Cola corporation, whose CEO also 
delivered a lengthy speech in a banqueting hall emblazoned with Coca Cola livery (albeit in 
desaturated colours!).   
 
But global influences are not only to be found in the cultural sphere: The Johannesburg (Jhb.) 
Securities Exchange (JSE) is heavily weighted in terms of resource stocks such as the giant 
Anglo American corporation, international paper giant SAPPI, energy giant SASOL and some of 
the biggest platinum mines in the world, namely Anglo Platinum and Impala Platinum.  The 
market capitalisations of these stocks and correspondingly the JSE, can experience rather wild 
volatilities in accordance with the changing fortunes of the South African currency, the Rand (R).  
 
The upshot is that SA is highly linked to the global economy and currency speculators can 
cause havoc – indeed the Rand reached an all time low of over R13 to the Dollar in recent 
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years. The Rand is currently fluctuating around the R7.40 mark and many economists expect it 
to trade in a band between R7 – R8 in the near future.    With many companies having overseas 
listings and the overall index of the JSE heavily biased toward so–called “rand hedge” stocks 
(essentially their costs are in Rands, but revenues are in overseas currencies, primarily US 
dollars, pounds sterling and German marks), company fortunes can change overnight.  
 
Overseas companies also have a presence in SA: the Ford Motor Company is set to invest 
about R1 billion (South African Rand; approximately US$ 137m), in car production (Fraser 
2003).  In so doing, it joins other global brands with a South African presence such as Toyota, 
BMW, Volkswagen, Daimler Chrysler and General Motors, (the latter owns 49 percent of the 
local Delta Motor Corporation).  Similarly, with increasingly global trade and the port of Durban 
anticipated to be moving as much as 2,2 million twenty foot equivalent units (containers) by 
2010,  the concession from the Durban terminal could be worth as much as R2 billion. (Durban 
is one of the top 30 ports globally in terms of throughput). One of the main bidders for the 
concession is the global firm of CSX world terminals, something that is opposed by the 
Transport and Allied Workers Union, which fears job losses (Enslin 2003). 
 
While Durban is a globally ranked port, SA ‘s primary city, Johannesburg has been accorded 
secondary global city status (although of course not everybody regards this as a status issue 
and/or a desirable mantle).  Johannesburg has undergone significant institutional and other 
transformation in the last decade and has spent some time constructing a far–reaching vision 
statement for the city.  The vision is that by 2030, Johannesburg will be 
 
a world-class city with service deliverables  and efficiencies, which meet world best 
practice. It’s (sic) economy and labour force will specialise in the service sector and    
will be strongly outward oriented such that the city economy operates on a global scale.  
The strong economic growth resultant from this competitive economic behaviour will 
drive up city tax revenues, private sector profits and individual disposable income levels 
such that the standard of living and quality of life of all the city’s inhabitants will increase 
in a sustainable manner (Johannesburg 2002).       
 
One could go on – globalisation and its effects is a vast topic and one could provide many 
examples of its effects in SA.  It is clear though, that SA is no longer in a laager and indeed its 
borders are somewhat porous - it is engaged in all manner of political, cultural, economic, 
sporting and other exchanges. (Unfortunately this includes porosity to international crime and/or 
drug syndicates, but this major problem will not be addressed here).       
 
Rather, I will examine this issue of the development of SA’s space economy against a 
globalisation backdrop and show how the country attempts to address spatial/development 
problems in this light .  Hence, I start with a very brief discussion on globalisation and then move 
on to a truncated history of the SA space economy and discussion of spatial frameworks and 
latter-day initiatives such as IDPs, and SDIs, with a brief case study of the Maputo SDI.   
 
A golden thread in this discussion thought is the overarching state approaches to development, 
namely the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and the Growth, Employment, 
and Redistribution (GEAR) approach.  These approaches, and the influence of globalisation 
results in a porosity and blurring of boundaries between ideologies, the state and the private 
sector and the space economy itself.   But now, what of globalisation? 
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Globalisation  
 
This is of course a vast topic and can be only briefly dealt with here.  A useful definition is 
provided by McGrew (1992: 12): Globalisation is  
 
the forging of a multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between the states and 
societies which make up the modern world system.  The processes by which events, 
decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to have significant 
consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the world. 
 
As McGrew (1992) notes, globalisation does not necessarily mean that the world is becoming 
more politically united or culturally homogeneous, nor can it “simply be equated with the global 
sing tendencies of modern capitalism… it has significant military, political, legal and cultural 
dimension  and has been associated with the spread of concepts such as liberal democracy,  
technical efficiency and it has also even affected southern African music! 
 
Globalisation took its place amongst other dominant characteristics of the global system in the 
1990s, such as a “superpower decline, complexity and diversity, the possible decline of the 
nation state and processes of international governance.   This is all in the context of  “the 
awesome complexity of the contemporary global system where issues such as arms control, 
ozone depletion, debt, drugs, terrorism, currency crises, space exploitation, human rights, 
hunger and HIV/AIDS “crowd the political agenda”  (McGrew 1992: 12,13). 
 
After World War II, the dominant global imperative was the cold war.  Up until the early 1990s, 
the  “central axis of world politics was East- West competition, the ‘Great Contest’ between 
capitalism and communism” (McGrew 1992: 12).  The so called “Third World” (TW) mattered 
only in that it became part of the agenda of superpower rivalries, but eventually managed to 
shift the debate from that solely of West vs. East, to North vs. South.  However, for a variety of 
reasons, including the fragmentation of TW political cohesion, first world antagonism and 
aggressive monetary and market oriented policies, 1980s economic recession and global 
industrial restructuring, and the end of the cold war and fundamental changes in the world order 
(McGrew 1992: 11-12).    
 
Especially after the oil crisis, technological innovation and the saturation of mass markets, there 
were a number of economic transformations: the collapse of a system of mass production as 
firms moved into highly differentiated mass markets, a new wave of innovation centred around 
information and telecommunication technologies, the increasing importance of the service 
sector in relation to other tertiary activities such as tourism, the informalisation of economic 
activity, changes in the organisation of production with increasing emphasis on flexible labour 
practices, the liberalisation of financial markets, the increasing power of transnational 
corporations, and the relocation of industry from the industrial heartlands in North America to 
Europe to the low wage periphery (Harrison 1998: 14). 
 
Also, the “global city” (GC) is often a much sought after mantle, one that will supposedly place a 
city or country on the world stage. Similarly,  “glossy globalisation”  presents globalisation as a 
favourable process which promotes technological progress, stimulates capital investment, 
increased the productivity of labour and results in more goods and services for the world’s 
people… however, globalisation has less desirable attributes at some times and places: 
increased unemployment, lower wages and labour standards, homogenization of cultures, 
environmental degradation, social polarization, racial animosities, the ‘new urban poverty’”   
(Marcuse 2003). 
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Thus, the discourse of global and global cities has been viewed by some as, inter alia, 
increasingly neo–imperialist and econocentric (Robinson 2003).  Johannesburg’s future, for 
example, is “entwined into of the most powerful discourse and set of practices shaping cities.  
The idea of being a global city and the urgent requirement to improve living conditions for the 
poor are respectively parameters of the world city hypothesis and developmentalist 
understandings” (Robinson 2003: 259).   
 
Clearly then, globalisation has  numerous effects many protagonists and antagonists.  What of 
globalisation, development and the SA space economy?   A suitable backdrop is a discussion of 
the government’s approaches to the development challenge, viz. the RDP and GEAR. 
 
South Africa: RDP and GEAR  
 
The RDP 
 
As Craythorne (1997: 454) states,  “from 1990 onwards the ANC began a policy of grassroots 
consultation and academic investigation with a view to formulating policy for the future” and this 
culminated in the document entitled  the “RDP.”  It was published in 1994 as a policy framework 
and act.  This act did not define the RDP, but established a fund, which was to be used to 
finance RDP projects and programmes. In paraphrasing the RDP document’s 147 pages, there 
are some salient feature for the present discussion:  The RDP was seen as an ”integrated, 
sustainable  process, with one of its key programmes “meeting the basic needs [in urban, peri-
urban and rural areas] in respect of jobs, land, housing, water, electricity, telecommunications, 
transport, a clean and healthy environment, nutrition, health care, and social welfare” (ibid).  The 
RDP also turned attention towards , inter alia,  promotion of SA culture, sports and recreation, 
collective bargaining,  affirmative action measures, “strong” metropolitan government, elected 
local government with a  ”developmental culture, ” and the promotion of small business 
including the promotion of  more favourable procurement policies.  
 
GEAR    
 
The RDP Ministry office was closed in 1996. (Its head later became a prominent businessman 
in SA). In its place came a market–based approach to urban development within an increasingly 
conservative national economic framework.  Soon afterwards, the government had adopted a 
new policy framework – Growth, Employment, and Redistribution, at the centre of which were 
polices such as privatisation.  Thus the local government of Jhb embarked on a privatisation of 
municipal services that set it on a collision course with trades unions, for example, the SA Allied 
Municipal Workers Union. 
 
The upshot is that although GEAR has been in the ascendancy, there are still vestiges of the 
RDP in SA  -- the borders are blurred and we shall see how this plays out in SA spatial planning 
and problems solving initiatives…  To begin with though, one needs to understand the legacy of 
apartheid.  
 
A truncated history of the development of the SA Space economy   
 
Borders and boundaries have always played an important role in SA’s development and the 
nature of its space economy.  The policy of apartheid imposed boundaries in a quite literal 
sense, by seeking to have blacks located in their own “homelands and only seen as temporary 
sojourners in white South African cities, to a satisfy the demand for labour, especially on the 
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mines.  Legislation saw to it that blacks owned only 13 percent of the land and were not 
permitted to live in white areas (via the group areas act) and as part of influx control measures, 
they were required to carry a pass in order to ”legitimately “ be in “white areas” (Boshoff 1989). 
 
In the 1920s and 1930s there were few attempts at industrial dispersal; rather the emphasis was 
on industrial growth per se.  When the infamous National Party came to power in 1948 it 
envisaged territorial segregation on an ethnic basis: blacks were to live in 
reserves/bantustans/homelands and what the government would later attempt to legitimise as 
“national “ and :”independent states.” Urbanized Africans were given only temporary residence 
rights in “white area”  with a legal status of “politically rightness temporary visitors.”   There was 
not an immediate political approach to industrial dispersal, but the government concentrated on 
tightening up direct influx control  to hold labour down in the white farming areas, and less 
urgently in the reserves.  In the late 1950s, white investment was permitted only on the borders 
of the homelands as it was felt that white capital and a white presence inside homeland borders 
would challenger at least dilute segregationist policy (Boshoff 1989).  
 
Following Verwoerd’s (the prime architect of apartheid) public pronouncement on industrial 
dispersal in 1960, a range of incentives was offered in order to entice industrialists to invest in 
growth points, which bordered the homelands.  These incentives included subsidies to social 
overhead capital, tax concessions, financial assistance, labour concessions, transport subsidies 
and tariff protection, the aim of all these measures was clear:  to halt, or even reverse the flow 
of Africans to the “white areas.”    
 
In the 1970s, white capital was allowed across “borders” into the homelands, and the 1975 
National Physical Development Plan appeared – the fist time a regional plan was concerned 
with the rest of the SA space economy and the first stirrings of notions of corridor development 
with the demarcation of a number of growth axes and later guide plans (Harrison and Todes 
1996).  Although homelands remained separate and distinct entities, now there were also thirty-
eight planning regions, nodal cores and a system of urban centres.  In keeping with the 
modernization paradigm of development, there was still an emphasis on (urban) 
industrialization, although there were some recommendations to include agriculture and the 
informal sector (Boshoff 1989). 
 
During the term of the comparatively reformist, but militaristic PW Botha, the boundaries 
between government and other actors softened: government met with big business and  the 
space economy changed again.  This time, the “Good Hope” plan of 1992 divided the country 
into eight, then nine development regions, which actually cut across homeland boundaries. 
Borrowing strongly from growth pole theory, (but ignoring many of its theoretical requirements  
such as the need to  having a limited number of designated growth poles, with propulsive 
industries with strong backward and forward linkages), the apartheid government fragmented 
the space economy and identified four metropolitan areas, ten “deconcentration points”,  almost 
50 “industrial development points,” and “other industrial points”  and “ad hoc” cases.  The 
industrial decentralization (ID) strategy did create some jobs in peripheral locations, but ID is 
generally regarded as a failure, with the apartheid government’s political/ideological agenda  
flying in the face of economic forces and exhibiting a great opportunity cost in terms of funds 
spent and jobs created.  Few of the growth poles attained any notion of sustainability  
(Boshoff 1989).   
 
In 1991, “a revised regional industrial development programme replace the system of selected 
growth poles with an almost spatially uniform application in which all new or expanding    
industries outside the then PWV region and Durban/Pinetown could apply for incentives, 
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substantially downgrade the level of incentives available to industrialists, and replaced the old 
input-related incentives with a market-related, output-based profit-oriented incentive.  In 1993, 
support was extended to small firms.  There was also an emphasis on export oriented industry, 
with Regional Industrial Development Programme (RIDP) subsidies applied together with the 
subsidies payable in them of the General Export inventive scheme” (Harrison 1998: 65). The 
1991 RIDP was associated with the creation of about 15 000 jobs, but this was limited 
compared with the loss of almost 58000 jobs in the manufacturing sector, largely due to 
pressures of globalisation.  At best, the RIDP provided “limited compensation for job losses as a 
consequence of lowered tariffs, illegal imports, and increased capital intensity merely reinforced 
existing patterns of development” (Harrison 1998: 72).    
 
Post-apartheid policy represents shift from import substitution to export oriented industrialisation 
and supply side support measures are seen as the most appropriate means to secure the 
necessary global competitiveness.  The Dept. of Trade and Industry is an important driver of 
latter-day regional policy due to the strong link to industrial policy (Harrison 1998: 74). The 
major elements of the DTI programme are industrial cluster initiatives, investment support via a 
tax holiday programmes and the small and medium manufacturing programme, support for 
small, medium and micro enterprise (SMME) and spatial development initiatives (SDIs) which 
we now turn attention to, after a brief discussion of spatial frameworks and Integrated 
development plans (IDPS).  
 
Spatial frameworks (SF) and IDPs 
 
(SF) have been used in many countries to inter alia, guide public sector investment and 
infrastructure and services, provide indicative guidance for private sector investment and as the 
basis for public /private collaboration and In SA, planners need to co-ordinate and integrate 
development .  This is a difficult enough task, and is bedevilled by the need to overcome the 
spatial and other impacts arising from the legacy of apartheid.    Furthermore, there is the “weak 
position of integrative spatial planning in relation to sectoral planning and interest, the lack of an 
effective institutional framework for inter sectoral co-ordination, the role of power and factional 
politics in shaping the rationality of planning frameworks, the way in which spatial frameworks 
often expose the varying objectives, interests and sometimes contradictory policy aims of 
government, and the difficulties in producing meaningful spatial frameworks where spheres of 
government are overlapping, and roles and responsibilities are subject to contestation.”  
(Harrison and Todes 2001:66).    
 
At the provincial level, some attempts have been made at producing non-statutory provincial 
growth and development strategies, but with limited success (Harrison and Todes 2001).  Far 
more attention has been paid to IDPs: according to the official Department of Local Government 
Guide Pack (n.d.) , “the IDP is a principal strategic planning instrument  which guides and 
informs all planning, budgeting, management  and decision –making in a municipality.  It has the 
following core components:  an assessment of the existing level of development,  (which 
includes identification of communities with no access to basic services), development strategies 
(including a municipality’s vision, and a council’s development priorities objectives and 
strategies), projects, and integration, which includes a spatial development framework, a 
disaster management plan and integrated financial plan, (both capital and operational budget), 
other integrated programmes and key performance indicators and performance targets, and 
approval.” 
 
IDPS are deemed necessary, due to the need to make effective use of scarce resources, to 
speed up delivery, help attract additional funds, strengthen democracy and hence institutional 
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transformation, co-ordinate sectoral plans, overcome the legacy of apartheid, promote 
intergovernmental coordination  (IDP guide pack n.d.).  
 
As Harrison (2001) has shown, IDPs have a rich genealogy and they reflect or draw on for 
example, new public management practices, historical and contemporary ideas about 
integration within the planning process and concepts of development and development 
planning.   Theoretical antecedents of integrated planning include regionalism /holism, 
procedural rationalism, and systems theory, radical planning theory, and collaborative planning.  
IDPs have been influenced by international agents, such as the GTZ, the World Bank, and the 
ODA. 
 
But, “some tensions accompany this coalescence, for example, the IDPs emerged just as 
government was shifting ideological gears from the RDP to the GEAR strategy.   This meant 
that concerns with institutional and other transformation and equity and participatory 
governance, were sitting alongside the drive to efficiency and fiscal responsibility, priorities 
expenditure, and budgets being linked to strategic objectives.  The state would provide a 
framework for development, with the private sector being responsible for delivery” (Harrison 
2001).   
 
Furthermore, in 1996, “the ANC government confronted its first economic crisis since taking 
office: a rapid outflow of foreign capital and a sudden fall in the value of the Rand.  The 
pressures to abandon ‘leftist rhetoric and pacify global capital were great.  Clearly, any notion of 
central planning-even of the type espoused by the RDP office-was not easily reconciled with an 
economic orthodoxy” (Harrison 2001: 186).   Again we see the influence of globalisation in the 
SA space economy and development effort. In the face of many of the development difficulties 
in SA, especially those of integration, IDPs proceed apace, with some success, but I now 
examine Spatial Development Initiatives(SDIs). 
 
Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs). 
(This section draws heavily on Rogerson (2001-various). 
 
SDIs are also supposed to impact on and redress the SA space economy, but in terms of 
corridor development rather than nodal development.  As Peberdy and Crush (2001: 115) state, 
the SDI programme involves identification of key geographical zones (often along pre –existing 
transportation arteries) with demonstrated economic potential for investment.”  (Often though, 
infrastructure has to be significantly upgraded).  The programme in South Africa was conceived 
in 1995 and is supposed to promote higher rates of both economic growth and job creation and 
intensive intervention in an identified area to fast-track private sector investment, to stimulate 
the growth of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) and to enhance the empowerment 
of local communities.  In so doing it supports the GEAR programme, such that SA might attain a 
competitive export-oriented economy with private investment from domestic and international 
sources.  
 
This si not lightweight initiative -- in one speech President Mandela described South Africa’s SDI 
programme as “akin to an industrial revolution” and viewed the planned SDIs as “important 
stations for boarding the development train” (South African High Commission, London, 1998:4, 
cited in Rogerson 2001a: 249).   The architects of the SDI programme argue that a “paradigm 
shift” has occurred in economic policy from the formerly “protected and isolated 
approach to economic development, towards one in which international competitiveness, 
regional cooperation, and a more diversified ownership base is paramount” (Jourdan et al., 
1996: 2, cited in Rogerson 2001a: 253). 
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After Rogerson (2001a: 254), the major strategies for the SDI programme stress four core 
themes: the “crowding-in” and co-ordination of public and private sector investment in areas of 
proven, albeit often underutilised, potential for economic development; ensuring political 
support, commitment and buy-in for the SDI process from the highest levels of government in 
order to facilitate a fast and focused planning approach; the use of well-planned and publicised 
opportunities for the private sector to obtain detailed information about the SDIs and how they 
might invest in them. Another planned output is the clustering of key industries around strategic 
anchor projects in order to harmonise productive activities and maximize their local linkages or 
multipliers.  
 
Another form of SDI is the industrial development zone (IDZ), created in response to 
globalisation pressures.  This is not the same as an export-processing zone, such as is found in 
many developing countries, but is seen as a specialised industrial area within an SDI to promote 
exports.  Attention turns now to the Maputo Development Corridor 
 
The Maputo SDI or Maputo Development Corridor (MDC)  
 
The MDC crosses the Mpumalanga province in South Africa and parts of the Gaza and Maputo 
provinces in southern Mozambique and will eventually link up with a corridor to Walvis Bay in 
Namibia, through Botswana. It is the “most advanced development corridor in Africa” (Mitchell 
1998:1) and its methodology has as been “exported” to other African countries. 
 
Central to the MDC, is the “creation of an environment that will facilitate public private 
sector partnerships. A linked mechanism for crowding in local and international investments is a 
set of strategic interventions to provide the infrastructure required to unleash new economic 
potential in mining, state -of-the-art manufacturing, tourism, gaming and agriculture. “ (Rogerson 
2001a:260). 
 
The MDC project aims to regain the formerly important role of Maputo in the Southern 
African regional economy and to be a major potential player in world markets, via    
clusters of production activities, including the stainless steel, chemicals and agro-food sectors 
spin-offs from these activities, such as tourism, cultural villages, and casinos (Rogerson 2001a).  
The MDC has also generated a brisk trade from informal cross border traders and yet again the 
issue of shifting borders crops up.  In fact, the border post between Mozambique an SA is being 
upgraded, and “borders should shift from their traditional role as barriers and points of control to 
become bridges which facilitate the movement of good and people.”   (Peberdy and Crush 2001: 
115). 
 
In evaluating the MDC in particular, Mitchell (1998: 768)  concludes that the MDC has managed 
to enhance institutional capacity and mobilize over $200m to rehabilitate infrastructure, but with 
more investor interests being expressed n Mozambique than SA, and a tendency to generate 
more capital intensive than labour intensive growth, often to the detriment of environmental 
concerns.     In the end then, as Harrison (1998: 74) citing Murphy, notes, the SDI programme 
provides the spatial dimension to the government’s broader policy approach which attempts to 
marry the principles of and objectives of the RDP (equity, redistribution and basic needs), with 
those of GEAR (efficiency, growth and international competitiveness). However, Harrison (1998: 
75) also maintains that there is “some element of smoke and mirrors in the presentation of 
SDIS. To some extent a SDI represents a ‘packaging’ of project already planned by the private 
sector and a spatial focusing of investment capital that may have gone elsewhere in the country.  
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However, state support for SDI projects has reduced investment risk, and may well have led to 
investments that would otherwise not have occurred.”  
 
Conclusions 
 
The SA space economy and the striving for development has come a long way, but still faces 
great challenges.  One of those challenges is to deal with globalisation  -- a highly contested 
influence that has been shown by many authors to have myriad positive and negative effects 
and impacts.   This paper has shown that globalisation has also influenced SA spatial 
frameworks and policies, in the context of competing, but related demands, as evidenced in 
GEAR and the RDP.   I argue that there is a great danger of being simplistic and blinded by 
globalisation as a meta narrative and one should closely examine developmental goals and 
objectives, especially as they occur in a variety of contexts.  For example, “just as Jhb’s citizens 
and managers must grapple with that city’s complexity, and devise creative ways of thinking 
about its future, and negotiating present dilemmas, so urban theorists need to move beyond 
globalisation and developmentalism, and embrace the ordinary, but dynamic complexity of 
urban life” (Robinson 2003: 278). 
 
Also, as (Harrison 1998: 15) puts it:  “although the southern African region is indeed linked to 
the global economy and global forces, it is not simply a “helpless pawn shaped entirely by 
forces outside the control of regional and local actors.  It is possible to improve the position of a 
region within the world economy by enhancing the positive attributes of the region.”  One hopes 
that the initiatives discussed in this paper are up to the task. 
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